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INTRODUCTION

This Article examines the root causes and pervasive impact of the
subprime mortgage market meltdown 1 and the subsequent global financial
crisis. 2 It seeks to demonstrate that government responses to the crisis, both
in terms of timing and in terms of substance, neglected small business operations and community banks, which continued to feel the impact of the
meltdown. 3 The Article concludes that supervisory and regulatory authority
exists to address these concerns and needs to be invoked effectively.4

* Distinguished Professor and Scholar, University of the Pacific McGeorge School
of Law. J.D., University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D., Georgetown University. Copyright© 2011
Michael P. Malloy. Some portions of this Article are derived from a forthcoming supplement
to MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION (3 vols., 2d ed., Aspen Publishers,
2011). I wish to thank the Western New England University School of Law and especially
Professor Eric J. Gouvin, Director, Law and Business Center for Advancing Entrepreneurship at Western New England, for their kind invitation to present an earlier version of this
Article as part of the 2011-2012 Speakers Series.
1. On the subprime mortgage market meltdown, see MICHAEL P. MALLOY,
ANATOMY OF A MELTDOWN (2010).
2. See infra Part I. On the global financial crisis that emerged in the wake of the
U.S. subprime mortgage market meltdown, see 3 MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING LAW AND
REGULATION§ 15.06 (2d ed. 2011).
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part III.
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I. ROOT CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
A. The Subprime Mortgage Meltdown

The financial crisis that has persisted since 2008 is now often referred
to generically as the "Great Recession," but this is no more than a clever
label suggesting a connection between the current situation and the Great
Depression of 1929-1935. The grim reality is, of course, that there is a complex of causes that contributed to the present financial crisis, and sorting
them out will be a formidable task. 5 Acknowledging the subtleties of the
problem should not distract us from the central narrative of the crisis6-that
unrestrained marketing of certain financial services morphed into a capital
markets failure in the United States and eventually into a transnational disaster. To begin with, then, it is worthwhile to pluck out those narrative
strands that may lead us to the root causes of the crisis, which may then
enhance our understanding of the continuing impact of the crisis on small
business.
In the early 2000s,7 mortgage loan originators began to make residential mortgage loans based on lower underwriting standards, often referred to
as subprime loans. 8 In the first half of the decade, there were no apparent

5. For a very useful preliminary analysis of those causes, see Oren Bar-Gill, The
Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
1073 (2009).
6. Congress, for example, seems to be in danger of losing sight of that central
narrative, as legislative debate turns to the possible economic harm that previous congressional responses to the crisis may impede recovery by imposing burdensome externalities on
business growth. See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, Dodd-Frank Act a Favorite Target for Republicans Laying Blame, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2011, at B I (reporting on political arguments
characterizing post-meltdown reform legislation as "government overreach that is killing
jobs.").
7. Portions of this discussion are based upon the Federal Housing Finance Board's
remarks concerning the subprime mortgage crisis in connection with its proposal to establish
affordable housing homeownership set-aside programs, for the purpose of refinancing or
restructuring eligible nontraditional or subprime owner-occupied mortgage loans. Affordable
Housing Program Amendments, 73 Fed. Reg. 20,552, 20,552-53 (proposed Apr. 16, 2008);
Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 73 Fed. Reg.
36,212 (proposed June 25, 2008).
8. In general, a subprime loan may be understood as a "residential mortgage loan[]
based on lower underwriting standards." 2 MALLOY, supra note 2, at 6-38. The Securities and
Exchange Commission has characterized subprime loans according to the following features
a mortgage loan that does not conform to the underwriting standards required for
sale to the government sponsored enterprises (non-conforming loans) and are made
to borrowers who: (I) have weakened credit histories such as payment delinquencies, charge-offs, judgments, and bankruptcies; (2) have reduced repayment capacity as measured by credit scores (e.g., FICO), debt-to-income ratios, loan-to-value
rations, or other criteria; (3) have not provided documentation to verify all or some
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negative repercussions from this increasingly common lending practice, but
by mid-2006 "home values had leveled off and were beginning to decline."9
This trend led to a gradual increase in delinquencies and defaults in subprime mortgage loans. 10 This increase in subprime loan delinquencies and
defaults had substantial adverse effects on the market for securities backed
by subprime loans and on the collateralized debt obligations (COOs) linked
to such loans. 11
The situation was further exacerbated by the adjustable rate feature
that was characteristic of the subprime mortgages. 12 Not surprisingly perhaps, the interest rates on subprime ARMs and other nontraditional mortgages increased substantially over time. 13 As these mortgages reset, many of
the mortgagors confronted "an unaffordable increase in their mortgage

of the information, particularly financial information, in their loan applications; or
(4) have any combination of these factors.
Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 73 Fed. Reg.
36,212,36,212 n.l (2009).
9. /d. at 36,212.
10. Id. (citing Testimony of John C. Dugan Before the U.S. S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, !lOth Cong. 8-12 (2008) (testimony of John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency)); The State of the Banking Industry Before U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, !lOth Cong. 5-6 (2008) (statement of Sheila C. Bair,
Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.).
II. Id. at 36,212.
12. See Affordable Housing Program Amendments, 73 Fed. Reg. 20,552, 20,552-53.
According to the Federal Housing Finance Board, typical features of subprime adjustable
rate mortgages (ARMs) include:
"2/28" and "3/27" loans, in which the [mortgagor] pays an introductory, often a
low "teaser" interest rate, fixed for the first two or three years, after which the rate
becomes adjustable, usually on an annual basis. Principal and interest payments increase because they are typically "recast" on two common types of nontraditional
loans: Interest-only loans and option ARMs. For an interest-only loan, the [mortgagor] pays only interest for a specified period, e.g., five years. Payments are then
recast to include the loan's principal, which is amortized over the remaining term
of the loan. With an option ARM, the [mortgagor] has the monthly option of paying less than the fully amortizing principal and interest payment, and it may pay as
little as a minimum payment that includes no principal and less than the full
amount of interest. Unpaid interest is added to the loan balance resulting in "negative amortization." In most option ARMs, the lender recasts the payment to reamortize the increased principal and interest either periodically, e.g., every 5 years,
or whenever the negative amortization reaches a specified cap, typically 125% of
the original loan amount. Nontraditional loans may have adjustable interest rates,
which can compound the increase in the amount of the monthly payments and the
amount of negative amortization.
!d. at 20,553 n.l.
13. /d. at 20,553 ("About 1.5 million subprime ARMs [were] scheduled to reset
upward in 2008." (citing Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Fostering Sustainable Homeownership, at the National Community Reinvestment Coalition Annual Meeting
(Mar. 14, 2008))).
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payments." 14 Many were "not able to sustain homeownership without areduction in their monthly mortgage payments.'' 15 However, given current
market conditions, subprime mortgagors found themselves in a position
where they could neither sell the property and pay off the subprime loan,
nor refinance the property in a more affordable mortgage arrangement, because there was insufficient equity in the property to make sale or refinancing feasible. 16 This phenomenon of "payment shock"' 7-high cost-toincome ratio and an inability to liquidate or refinance-increasingly led to
foreclosure as the only option available to many mortgagors. "More than 20
percent of the roughly 3.6 million subprime ARMs outstanding at the end of
2007 either were in foreclosure or [were] 90 days or more past due." 18
Geographic concentration of subprime mortgages further exacerbated
the economic crisis in regions of the country. 19 Large numbers of foreclosed
and unoccupied properties would as a result negatively affect property values throughout entire neighborhoods. 20 Beyond the subprime problem, however, as the crisis deepened in the last three quarters of 2008, mortgage
foreclosures and delinquencies in lower-risk prime loans more than doubled.21
What gradually became apparent was that these foreclosures were not
isolated incidents but part of a systemic breakdown in the mortgage market. 22 In another context, I have described the system that eventually failed
as
an "origination-to-distribution" model of debt securitization, a mark-to-market system, believed to be a more robust way of spreading risk than the more conservative
investment analysis of the 1960s. While the subprime mortgage market emerged as
a result of aggressive marketing by non-bank lenders such as "lightly regulated"
14. /d. at 20,553; see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2008 TO 2018 23 (2008), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.
cfm?index=8917&type=l (estimating subprime-related losses).
15. Affordable Housing Program Amendments, 73 Fed. Reg. at 20,553.
16. For a description of the broad impact of subprime foreclosures on the economy,
see Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Remarks by Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Current
Housing and Mortgage Market Developments Georgetown University Law Center (Oct. 16,
2007), available at http://www. treasury .gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp612.aspx.
17. See Bar-Gill, supra note 5, at 1076 (discussing "payment shock").
18. Affordable Housing Program Amendments, 73 Fed. Reg. at 20,553; see also
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Fostering Sustainable Homeownership, at the
National Community Reinvestment Coalition Annual Meeting (Mar. 14, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080314a.htm.
19. Affordable Housing Program Amendments, 73 Fed. Reg. at 20,553.
20. /d.
21. Mike Ferullo, Regulators Finds More Prime Mortgages Under Stress, Problems
With Modifications, BNA BANKING DAILY, Apr. 3, 2009, at D24.
22. See Michael P. Malloy, The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and Bank Regulation,
BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL'Y REP., Mar. 1, 2008, at 1-2 (discussing systemic aspects of
sub prime mortgage crisis).
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mortgage finance companies (MFCs) to less credit-worthy borrowers, larger depository institutions responded to the increased MFC market share by easing credit
standards, often through state-chartered MFC subsidiaries. Lenders of all types
vigorously sold these loan products to subprime mortgagors, and then packaged the
portfolios of mortgages into such securitized products as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) that were analyzed and rated by credit rating agencies and marketed
to institutional investors by investments banks. Securitization of these portfolios
ameliorated lending risk, and the net proceeds of CDO placements provided lenders with funding to expand the subprime mortgage market itself. The cycle continued to operate, expanding as it drew more investors into the system and encouraged ever-increasing competition for subprime products and programs. When the
cycle eventually wobbled--as the inherent counterparty risk manifested itself in
the inability of the mortgagors to sustain markedly increasing levels of indebtedness---the system began to break down as the value of the CDO portfolios dramatically contracted. 23

The failure of this market has led to more than waves of foreclosures
and losses for the financial institutions tied to the system. 24 The failure has
also called into question the efficacy of basic regulatory programs intended
to support safety and soundness in banking. For example, the chair of the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision at the Bank for International Settlements25 suggested that bank capital adequacy requirements, 26 newly revised at the time under the auspices of the Basel Committee itself, might
need to be reevaluated. 27 In fact, a lengthening series of delays has ensued in
light of the collapse of the capital markets/8 and the revised requirements
have yet to be implemented. 29
23. !d. at I.
24. See Daniel Pruzin, Subprime Crisis Signals Need for More Work on Capital
Accord, Basel Panel Head Says, BNA BANKING DAILY, Mar. 6, 2008, at Dl3 (discussing
U.S. banking sector losses).
25. On the role of the Basel Committee in the establishment of international capital
adequacy standards, see 3 MALLOY, supra note 2, § 15.02[C][l].
26. On capital adequacy requirements, see 2 MALLOY, supra note 2, § 7.03[C][4].
27. See, e.g., Pruzin, supra note 24 (reporting on public remarks by Basel Committee Chair, Nout Wellink).
28. See, e.g., Risk-Based Capital Guidelines: Market Risk, 76 Fed. Reg. 1890 (Jan.
II, 2011) (proposing revisions to market risk capital rules); BASEL COMMITIEE ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, STRENGTHENING THE RESILIENCE OF THE BANKING SECTOR: CONSULTATIVE
DOCUMENT (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs 164.pdf (proposing changes to
definition of capital, introduction of leverage ratio, and changes to treatment of counterparty
credit risk); BASEL COMMITIEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REVISIONS TO THE BASEL II
MARKET RISK FRAMEWORK (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl48.pdf (discussing changes); Capital Adequacy Guidelines: Trust Preferred Securities and the Definition
of Capital; Delay of Implementation Date, 74 Fed. Reg. 12,076 (Mar. 23, 2009) (announcing
decision of Federal Reserve Board to delay implementation of Basel revisions).
29. See BASEL COMMITIEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PROGRESS REPORT ON BASEL
III IMPLEMENTATION (2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publlbcbs203.pdf (indicating
United States lagging in adopting regulatory requirements under existing Basel II accord as
well as recently adopted Basel 2.5 and Base! III supplementary agreements).
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What may be most revealing about initial governmental responses to
the crisis, however, is the relative lack of attention to its impact on individuals and small businesses. At first, the U.S. Government seemed to deny that
there was a crisis. For example, in April 2008, Federal Reserve chairman
Ben Bemanke was still suggesting that "[t]hese problems notwithstanding,
the originate-to-distribute model has proven effective in the past and with
adequate repairs, could be so in the future." 30 Throughout the first half of
2008, U.S. regulatory response to the subprime crisis was inconsequential,
consisting only of"guidance" to lenders. 31
It reveals much about the regulators' collective responses that it was
not the mortgage crisis itself, as it affected borrowers, that prodded the
regulators into action, but the near failure of investment firms involved in
the CDO market. Historically, U.S. regulators have characteristically been
slow to respond to financial deprivation affecting retail consumers but
prompt to support large institutional participants in the financial markets.
Thus, on March 13, 2008, when Bear Steams & Co. Inc. saw its liquidity
fall from approximately $12.4 billion to $2 billion as a result o(the dissipation of the market's confidence in the firm and the refusal of its counterparties to act, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department swiftly facilitated a loan to Bear Steams through bank holding company JPMorgan
Chase & Co. 32 This was followed by a loan to JPMorgan to support its outright acquisition of Bear Steams at a price of $2.00 per share (later raised to
$10.00). 33
Attention to those aspects of the crisis affecting home mortgage borrowers did not receive such swift attention, and it is here that we can discern
a linkage to small business performance. Not only was the small business
sector impacted by the general effects of the significant economic downturn,
but it also began to lose access to a traditional funding source-personal
credit of small business principals and lines of credit linked to residential

30. Jeff Day, Bernanke Touts Fed's Action in Credit Crunch, Contrasts It With
1929's Passive Central Bank, BNA BANKING DAILY, Apr. 11, 2008, available at
http://pubs.bna.com/ip/bna!bbd.nsf/eh/AOB6H3F9T2 (quoting Chairman Bernanke).
31. See, e.g., Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,569 (July
I 0, 2007) (Interagency Statement) (providing interagency guidance "to clarify how [depository] institutions [could] offer certain adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) products in safe and
sound manner"); Final Guidance-Illustrations of Consumer Information for Hybrid Adjustable Rate Mortgage Products, 73 Fed. Reg. 30,997 (May 29, 2008) (publishing four documents that set forth illustrations "intended to assist institutions in implementing the consumer
protection portion of," and "in providing information to consumers on hybrid [ARM] products as recommended by," the Interagency Statement).
32. Aaron Lorenzo, Regulators Defend Bear Stearns Decision; Senators Ask If Fed
Needs Additional Powers, BNA BANKING DAILY, Apr. 4, 2008, at D9.
33. Aaron Lorenzo, New York Fed, JPMorgan Chase Agree on Details in Deal for
Bear Stearns, BNA BANKING DAILY, Mar. 25,2008, available at http://www.bna.com.
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mortgages of the principals. 34 It was not until the very end of April2008 that
a bipartisan housing stimulus package could be scheduled for legislative
consideration in the Senate. 35 Even here there was little agreement between
the House and Senate as to the appropriate way to address the crisis as it
affected countless citizens. The House Ways and Means Committee emphasized home-buyer tax credits,36 while the House Financial Services Committee considered a foreclosure prevention bill, H.R. 3221, that included authorization for wholesale refinancing of mortgages in danger of default, a
provision much maligned by White House policy advisers. 37 By late July
2008, however, the legislative tide had turned decisively in favor of H.R.
3221, with the passage of the bill in the House by a substantial margin and
Senate passage expected. 38
Of course, the subprime mortgage crisis is not just about the personal
financial tragedies triggered by improvident mortgage lending. Fueling the
dramatic expansion of this sector was the facility of the investment markets
in securitizing these mortgages into CDOs sold to a wide range of institutional investors. 39 The existence of the CDO market had the apparent effect
of moderating the risk of lenders and feeding their liquidity levels, with the
result that the subprime mortgage market experienced growth at significant
rates. 40 The poor quality of the underlying mortgage obligations has now
had serious adverse effects on the value of CDO portfolios, to the great distress of many institutional investors. 41 The Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission made it clear during remarks at a February 2008
conference42 that the Commission was investigating possible securities fraud

34. See, e.g., David D. Chait, Small Business Financing and the Post-2008 Credit
Paradigm: the US. Small Business Administration and Key Factors to Support Traditional
Credit Markets, 6 OHIO ST. ENTREPREN. Bus. L.J. 411, 417 (20 II) ("[S]mall businesses faced
a new world in 2008 with increasing cost of capital as well as tightening credit standards,
coupled with decreased housing values and uncertain sales.").
35. Thecla Fabian, Senate Starts Housing Stimulus Debate; Bankruptcy Amendment
on indefinite Hold, BNA BANKING DAILY, Apr. 7, 2008, at D9.
36. Heather M. Rothman, Ways and Means Set to Consider $11 Billion Housing Tax
Measure, BNA BANKING DAILY, Apr. 9, 2008, at Dll.
37. Richard Cowden, Frank, White House Advisers Exchange Barbs over Features
ofForeclosure Prevention Bill, BNA BANKING DAILY, Apr. II, 2008, at DIO.
38. Mike Ferullo, House Approves Massive Housing Aid Bill with Financial Backstop for Fannie, Freddie, BNA BANKING DAILY, July 24,2008, at 015.
39. Chait, supra note 34, at 416.
40. /d. at415.
41. See id. at 416 ("[E]xposure to these products extended deep into the financial
system, leading to fundamental changes in the entire market as defaults grew.").
42. Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks to the 'SEC
Speaks in 2008' Program of the Practicing Law Institute: the SEC Agenda for 2008 (Feb. 8,
2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch020808cc.htm.
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and breaches of fiduciary duty in the marketing of CD0s. 43 In its investigation, the Commission was considering whether the banking enterprises that
packaged the mortgages and the securities firms that marketed the CDOs
made appropriate public disclosures concerning the valuation of CDOs and
the risks involved. 44 By June 2008, these investigations had already resulted
in civil charges by the Commission,45 and criminal indictments,46 against
two former portfolio managers in the asset management division of Bear
Stearns. Nevertheless, it was not until a March 2008 Senate Banking Committee hearing that the regulators grudgingly admitted that they had not
"fully appreciated all [the] risks out there" and acknowledged the gravity of
the dramatic reductions in bank earnings, the mounting foreclosures, and the
difficulties still to be faced in restoring liquidity in the credit markets. 47
The broadened responses of the Administration and the regulators still
tended to be somewhat unfocused. With much fanfare, the Administration
announced in mid-March 2008 proposed measures intended to prevent a
future financial crisis, rather than to respond to the present one. 48 These
measures represented a call to states and market participants to tighten market supervision. Thus, states were urged to establish nationwide licensing
standards for MFCs, while lenders would be required to improve the quality
of the disclosure that they provide to borrowers about payment terms, and
stronger conflict-of-interest rules would apply to credit rating agencies that
assess the risk of CDO offerings. 49 The proposals were widely dismissed as
ineffective and limited, though they were praised by industry representatives.50

43. Rachel McTague, Cox Outlines SEC Agenda for 2008, Including Initiatives
Related to Subprime, BNA BANKING DAILY, Feb. II, 2008, at D I 0.
44. !d. In addition, one can expect the Commission to consider whether brokerdealers complied with suitability requirements in selling COOs and other debt-related derivatives to their customers. !d.
45. Complaint at 1-4, SEC v. Cioffi, 2008 WL 4693320 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2008)
(No. 08CV2457), 2008 WL 2446253.
46. See, e.g., Indictment, United States v. Cioffi, 2008 WL 2448463 (E.D.N.Y. Jun.
18, 2008) (No. 08CR00415).
47. Richard Cowden, Senators Grill Financial Regulators on Failure To Supervise
Banks During Mortgage Crisis, BNA BANKING DAILY, Mar. 5, 2008, available at
http://pubs.bna.com/ip/bna/bbd.nsf/eh/AOB6D6Q7UI (quoting Federal Reserve Governor,
Donald Kohn).
48. See Stephen Labaton, White House Offers Plan To Ward Off Credit Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14,2008, at AI.
49. !d.
50. !d. By contrast, the SEC has proposed additional requirements on "nationally
recognized statistical rating organizations" to deal with "concerns about the integrity of their
credit rating procedures" and methods for determining COO credit ratings linked to subprime
mortgages. Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 73
Fed. Reg. 36,212 (June 25, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 249b).
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At the same time, the regulators were initiating modest tweaks to the
system to address the crisis. In March 2008, for example, the OCC issued an
interim final rule to add a provision to the lending limits regulation that addressed temporary funding arrangements in emergency situations such as
critical financial markets stability. 51 The rule enabled the OCC to establish a
special lending limit for loans and extensions of credit if it determined that
such loans and extensions of credit (i) were "essential to address an emergency"; (ii) would be relatively short in duration; (iii) would decrease in
amount on a schedule and in a manner acceptable to the OCC; and, (iv)
would "not present unacceptable risk" to the lending national bank. 52 Given
these predicate conditions, it is understandable that the rule mandated supervisory oversight and reporting requirements that the OCC determined to
be appropriate to monitor compliance with the conditions. 53 The rule was
effective March 20, 2008, with comments due by April 21, 2008. 54 Similarly, in April 2008, the Federal Housing Finance Board proposed an amendment to its Affordable Housing Program (AHP) authorizing the FHLBanks
to establish set-aside programs to refinance or restructure nontraditional or
subprime owner-occupied mortgage loans of eligible households. Efforts at
systemic reform were very slow in coming. Proposals prior to the meltdown
of the capital markets in the fall of 2008 appeared to be both ambitious and
without any serious prospect of realization. It would be two years before
serious legislative efforts would finally materialize. In March 2008 the President's Working Group on Financial Markets (PWG), chaired by the Treasury Secretary, offered a broader and more detailed set of proposals. 55 In its
report the PWG identified short-term recommendations, designed to be implemented immediately; 56 intermediate-term recommendations, designed to
be implemented in the intermediate term to increase the efficiency of financial regulation; 57 and a long-term "Optimal Regulatory Structure," intended
to reform and strengthen the regulation of U.S. financial institutions. 58 The
Treasury recommendations were ambitious and complex, but they ultimately fed into the recommended long-term "optimal regulatory structure." This
structure was itself a model of simplicity, based on fundamental principles

51. 12 C.F.R. § 32.8 (2011).
52. !d.
53. /d.
54. Lending Limits, 73 Fed. Reg. 14,922 (Mar. 20, 2008).
55. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY BLUEPRINT
FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2008) [hereinafter TREASURY
BLUEPRINT], available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf.
56. !d. at 75-86.
57. /d. at 89-133.
58. /d.atl37-79.
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of functional regulation. 59 In contrast to the current thicket of institutional
regulators that now supervise financial services in the United States, the
recommended structure would include a relatively small core group of specialized regulators.
Unfortunately, the Treasury Blueprint followed in a long tradition of
broad studies of the structure of financial services regulation that have never
come to fruition. 60 Particularly for a study that emerged in the last months of
a presidential term, the prospects for adoption of its recommendations
seemed rather limited. What we were left with were the current responses to
the subprime mortgage crisis as they then existed, responses that so far have
done little to assuage the markets or bring significant relief to borrowers.
The sad irony is that the Administration's March 13 pian-as well as
the PWG Blueprint-relied on two basic elements that were simply no
longer reliable. One was the notion of market discipline and voluntary restraint as a protection against disaster, 61 features that had obviously not been
very efficacious in the present crisis. The other was the assumption that
state regulation of MFCs and the mortgage markets could be harnessed to

59. On functional regulation, which establishes regulatory structures relating to
functions and activities to be regulated rather than the nature of the particular institution
being regulated, see TASK GROUP ON REGULATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, BLUEPRINT FOR
REFORM: THE REPORT OF THE TASK GROUP ON REGULATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 39-40
(1984)
[hereinafter
BLUEPRINT
FOR
REFORM],
available
at
http://ia600402 .us.archive.org/11 /items/blueprintforrefoO 1unitlblueprintforrefoO I unit. pdf.
See generally 1 MALLOY, supra note 2, §§ 1.04[A]-[B] (discussing and contrasting institutional and functional regulation).
60. See, e.g., BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 59, at 44-52 (recommending fundamental changes to U.S. regulatory structure); U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, MODERNIZING
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM: U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT TREASURY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS 61-63 (1991); see also I MALLOY, supra note 2, §§
1.04[A], [D] (discussing Task Group and Modernizing, respectively). The Treasury Blueprint
itself notes,
Over the past forty years, a number of Administrations have presented important
recommendations for financial services regulatory reforms. Most previous studies
have focused almost exclusively on the regulation of depository institutions as opposed to a broader scope of financial institutions. These studies served important
functions, helping shape the legislative landscape in the wake of their release.
TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 55, at 3 (footnote omitted). For background on the prior
Administration studies referred to in the quotation, see id. at 197-206.
61. The Treasury Blueprint itself looks favorably on market discipline as a complement to supervisory policy. TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 55, at 137-38. At one point, it
notes that the "PWG, the Federal Reserve Bank ofNew York, and the OCC have previously
stated that market discipline is the most effective tool to limit systemic risk." I d. at 1S n.2
(citing AGREEMENT AMONG PWG AND U.S. AGENCY PRINCIPALS ON PRINCIPLES AND
GUIDELINES REGARDING PRIVATE POOLS OF CAPITAL (2007); PWG, HEDGE FUNDS,
LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 24-25, 30 (1999);
PWG, OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT
34-35 (1999)).
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"tighten their oversight of financial markets." 62 In the wake of the sweeping
preemption of state consumer-protection-based supervision of mortgage
bankers resulting from long-standing preemption initiatives of the OCC63
and the decision of the Supreme Court in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. 64
broadly confirming the Comptroller's policy, it would be foolish to expect
state-based supervision of MFCs and mortgage banking to be effective in
the current legal environment. This is the second linkage between the crisis
and the small business sector. With the aggressive preemption of state consumer protection law as applied to financial services, small business lost the
free rider benefits of the externalities of consumer protection. We may agree
with the PWG Blueprint that vigorous change is needed, but the roots of the
subprime mortgage crisis are to be found in the aggressively preemptive,
market-oriented policies of the Bush Administration.
The effects of the subprime mortgage market meltdown in 2008 continued to deepen and spread in 2009. As of year-end 2009, 140 banks had
been placed under Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation receivership, at a
likely cumulative cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) of more than
$1.8 billion. 65 In the first quarter of2010 (Q1 2010), the FDIC was appointed receiver for forty-one failed banks and savings associations with a total
exposure for the DIF of more than $320 million. 66 By contrast, five credit
unions failed during approximately the same period. 67 By Q1 2011, "more
than 3.5 million home mortgages were 90 or more days delinquent or in
foreclosure ... , and estimates indicate that more than one in five mortgage

62. Labaton, supra note 48, at A I.
63. See, e.g., Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895 (Jan. 13, 2004)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a)(3), (b)) (adopting regulations asserting broad preemptive
authority). For an analysis by the OCC of preemption principles post-Dodd-Frank Act, see
76 Fed. Reg. 43,549,43,554-558 (2011).
64. 550 U.S. I, 7 (2007). But cf Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 2710,
2717 (2009) (distinguishing Watters). For an exhaustive analysis of the role of state regulation and enforcement in effective consumer protection, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The
Dodd-Frank Act's Expansion of State Authority to Protect Consumers of Financial Services,
36 J. CORP. L. 893 (2011) (arguing that, particularly as compared with failure of federal
consumer protection in relation to sub-prime mortgage market, Dodd-Frank Act Title X
enables states to construct additional safety measures and to identil)' and counteract emerging threats to consumers of financial services).
65. Thecla Fabian, Failed Federally Insured Banks Now 140; Insurance Fund Falls
by $1.8 Billion Dec. 18, BNA BANKING DAILY, Dec. 22, 2009, at D9.
66. Thecla Fabian, Banks Fail in Georgia, Florida, Arizona; 2010 Now at 41 and
D/F Loses $320 Million, BNA BANKING DAILY, Mar. 30, 2010, at Dll.
67. Thecla Fabian, Small Connecticut Credit Union Fifth 2010 Failure; State Regulator Sees Many Problems, BNA BANKING DAILY, Apr. 9, 2010, at Dl7.
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borrowers owe[d] more on their mortgages than their homes [were]
worth."68
B. Transnational Aspects
The crisis quickly spread transnationally as well. By Q2 2009, lending
by internationally active banks had declined by 1.1 percent (to $30.37 trillion), according to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 69 In its latest manifestation, the crisis has significantly affected the economies of
many states that are members of the European Union, and in particular the
economy of states that participate in the common currency of the Euro
Zone. Member states like Greece and Ireland, and to a lesser extent Portugal, have been driven by financial distress into political crisis as well.7° The
situation remains decidedly in a state of flux. As the United States struggled
to formulate an appropriate response to the crisis, 71 other states-and particularly EU member states-faced the necessity of dealing with the spill-over
effects of the U.S. crisis in their own economies. At the EU level, in the
early stages of the crisis there was an effort towards increased union-wide
supervision in financial services markets, while at the member-state level,
68. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-l f-656, MORTGAGE REFORM:
POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF PROVISIONS IN THE DODD-FRANK ACT ON HOMEBUYERS AND THE
MORTGAGE MARKET I (20 II).
69. Daniel Pruzin, BIS Cites Continued Decline in Large Global Banks' Lending,
BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Oct. 23, 2009, at D6. The data reflect reporting by banks in
forty-two countries, including most of the world's major financial centers, but not China,
Russia, or Saudi Arabia. /d. A survey of the twenty-one largest banks receiving financial
assistance from the Treasury indicated that loan balances were trending downward beginning
in March 2009, and declining in June 2009 by one percent. Mike Ferullo, Loans Balances
Among TARP Recipients Declined in June, Treasury Reports, BNA BANKING DAILY, Aug.
18, 2009, at D9. However, there was a thirteen percent increase in new loan originations. !d.
Likewise, the percentage of "nontraditional," subprime or Alt-A loans and securities used as
collateral to support FHLBank advances to member savings associations and banks had
declined during 2008, accounting for approximately twenty percent of collateral securing
advances as of December 31, 2008. Federal Home Loan Bank Collateral for Advances and
Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Products, 74 Fed. Reg. 38,618 (Aug. 4,
2009).
70. See, e.g., Landon Thomas, Jr. & Christine Hauser, S.&P. Ranks Greece's Debt
World's Lowest, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2011, at Bl (discussing Greek collapse); Joe Kirwin,
EC OKs New Bailout for Failed Irish Bank As Talks Over Restructuring Plan Continue,
BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Aug. II, 2010, at D3 (discussing Irish crisis); Bengt Ljung,
EC, IMF, ECB Say Portugal Rescue Package Offers Balanced, Demanding, Realistic Path,
BNA lNT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, May 6, 2011, at D9 (outlining Portuguese rescue).
71. On the initial U.S. responses to the crisis, see Robert R. Bliss & George G.
Kaufman, Resolving Insolvent Large Complex Financial Institutions: A Better Way, 128
BANKING L.J. 339 (2011); John L. Ropiequet, Christopher S. Naveja & Jason B. Hirsh, An
Introduction to the Dodd-Frank Act-The New Regulatory Structure for Consumer Finance
Emerges, BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL'Y REP., Aug. 2010, at I.
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the individual member states were repudiating legislative proposals to estab..,
lish enhanced regional supervision in the insurance sector of the financial
services markef2 and the banking sector. 73 The result was a "shared approach" in which the twenty-seven EU member states agreed in midDecember 2008 to a $256 billion economic stimulus response that set parameters for individual member states to increase domestic spending and
reduce taxes, with EU-wide measures covering matters other than financial
services regulation. 74 Hence, direct EU policy concern was limited to safeguarding against anti-competitive effects of member state rescue efforts and
bailouts. Most, if not all, of the twenty-seven EU member states sought approval ofbank rescue plans from the European Commission, although some
of these requests for approval may only be pursued as a precaution. 75
The crisis continued to mutate towards a systemic crisis. In response,
in May 2009 the European Commission outlined a plan calling for a new
European Systemic Risks Council (ESRC) and new agencies to replace the
committees that dealt with prudential issues of cross-border banking, insurance, and financial services.76 To avoid a repetition of the crisis, the Commission plan contemplated that the ESRC would keep a continuous watch
on macroeconomic conditions in the EU and would issue warnings when
problems such as undercapitalized banks or real estate bubbles appeared to
threaten economic fundamentals. 77
Also in May 2009, the European Parliament voted overwhelmingly in
favor of amendments to the EU Capital Requirements Directive to establish
a new "college of supervisors" to oversee approximately forty-four banks
with cross-border operations, strengthen banking supervision, and prevent
future financial meltdowns. 78 The Directive mandated a "five-percent" retention rule requiring a banking institution selling securitized products to
72. Joe Kirwin, EU Finance Ministers Reject Enhanced Supervision in Insurance,
Banking Sectors, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Dec. 3, 2008, at D8 (reporting that EU
member state agreement to new insurance regulatory regime conditioned on omission of EUwide insurance supervision).
73. Joe Kirwin, Despite G-20 Stance, EU Members Resist EU-Wide Supervision of
Insurance, Banking, BNA BANKING DAILY, Nov. 24, 2008, at D19. But see Joe Kirwin, EU,
US. Should Work to Forge Joint Economic Recovery Package, Barroso Says, BNA INT'L
Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Dec. 10, 2008, at D6 (reporting that France and United Kingdom had
embraced commission plan for EU-wide stimulus package, with Germany still dissenting).
74. Joe Kirwin, EU Leaders Back $256 Billion Package of Economic Stimulus,
BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Dec. 15, 2008, at D7.
75. Sweden, Portugal Latest Nations to Receive EC Approval of Financial Rescue
Plans, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Oct. 31, 2008, available at http://bna.com.
76. Joe Kirwin, EC to Outline Plan for New Council to Monitor Banking, Financial
Services, BNA BANKING DAILY, May 26, 2009, at D25.
77. /d.
78. Joe Kirwin, EU Parliament OKs Plan to Tighten Supervision of Cross-Border
Banking, BNA BANKING DAILY, May 7, 2009, at D28.
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retain ownership over a portion of the offering. 79 It also limited any large
exposure of a banking institution to a single client or group of clients (including interbank lending) to twenty-five percent of"own funds." 80
In December 2009, a galvanizing event occurred, as the Austrian Government was forced to nationalize Hypo Alpe-Adria, one of the leading
Austrian banks, to prevent the bank's collapse as result of bad loans to Eastem European companies and the debt-ridden balance sheet of its parent, the
German regional bank, BayernLB. 81 "[T]he Austrian government took over
the shares for a token amount." 82 The Munich-based BayemLB, "the second
largest state-owned bank," was required "to write off more than $3 billion in
losses" resulting from its purchase of Hypo Alpe-Adria. 83 "The Austrian
Government also agreed to [inject] approximately $1 billion" into Hypo. 84
The crisis was worsening, and its spill-over effects were making its systemic dimension clearer.
In December 2009, EU finance ministers approved a new EU-wide
banking and financial services supervisory structure designed to prevent
future financial crises, with a sovereignty concession demanded by the
UK. 85 The structure included a "macro-prudential" European Systemic Risk
Board and a "micro-prudential" cluster of three new agencies supervising
cross-border activities in banking, insurance, and pensions. 86 These sectoral
agencies would not have the authority to require a member state to rescue a
particular financial institution with its headquarters in the member state. 87
However, it was unclear whether the European Parliament, where there was
79. Id.
80. Id. The twenty-five percent limit may be exceeded only for exposures between
credit institutions and then only up to €150 million (approximately $200 million). Id. For
these purposes, the term own funds refers to "[a] bank's available capital and reserves for the
purposes of capital adequacy rules." "Own Funds" Definition, Financial Markets Glossary,
MARKETS
INTERNATIONAL
LIMITED,
http://www.markets-international.com/glossary/
glossary4.htrnl#o.
81. Joe Kirwin, European Banking Crisis Erupts Again; Austria Forced to Nationalize Leading Bank, BNA BANKING DAILY, Dec. 15,2009, D12.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. The European Commission gave temporary approval to the rescue plan because of the systemic role that Hypo Alpe-Adria plays both in Austria and in other southeastern European countries. EC Gives Temporary OK to Nationalized Bank in Austria, but Asks
New Restructuring Plans, BNA BANKING DAILY, Dec. 24, 2009, at D8 (reporting on rescue).
The Commission also indicated that it was extending its in-depth investigation of state aid
not only to cover the rescue, but also BayernLB, which had already received almost $40
billion in bailout funds through capital injections and risk guarantees from the German Government. Id.
85. Joe Kirwin, EU Finance Ministers Reach Compromise on Bank Supervision, but
Parliament Objects, BNA BANKING DAILY, Dec. 3, 2009, at D23.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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considerable sentiment for a single EU banking and fmance supervisory
authority with broad powers, would approve the structure as compromised. 88
In April 2010, faced by unsustainable servicing costs for $400 billion
in public debt, the Greek Government became the first Euro Zone member
to request comprehensive assistance-as opposed to specific approval of an
individual bank rescue measure-from the Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund to provide a loan arrangement worth approximately $58 billion. 89 The announcement of the EU-IMF
plan helped to lower Greek sovereign debt interest rates over the short term,
but doubts about it emerged as some Euro Zone countries, led by Germany,
insisted that parliamentary approval would be required before bilateral loans
included in the plan would be authorized if Greece should request them. 90
At this point, one might argue that the financial crisis was beginning
to transform itself from a banking crisis into a challenge to the integrity of
the Euro itself. The implications of such a challenge were denied by EU
authorities. On May 10, 2011, for example, Economics Commissioner Olli
Rehn said, '"We don't have a crisis of the [E]uro. We have a sovereign debt
crisis in some [E]uro member states. "'91 A tenuous distinction, some might
argue, particularly in light of the events that followed. Yet the threat to the
integrity of the Euro does seem to be "collateral damage" stemming from
national financial crises gone systemic.
In August 2010, the European Commission approved an Irish Government bailout of approximately €9 billion ($13 billion) for Anglo Irish
Bank, one oflreland's leading financial institutions, to '"preserve financial
stability"' in the country. 92 So far as can be ascertained at present, Anglo
Irish Bank's difficulties were a result of the collapse of the commercial real
estate market in Ireland, in which the bank was aggressively invested, but
also a result in part of its portfolio investments in securitized assets funds
tied to the U.S. subprime mortgage market. 93 By November 2010, however,
the banking crisis had so overwhelmed the Irish economy that the collapse
of the banking system pushed the Irish Government into bankruptcy, requir88. /d.
89. Joe Ktrwin & Andrea Schuessler, Greece Succumbs to Market Pressure, Requests EU-IMF Public Finance Bailout, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Apr. 26, 20 I 0, at D8.
90. /d.
91. Bengt Ljung, EU Official: Portugal to Pay Interest Rate Above 5.5 Percent on
Emergency Loans, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, May II, 2011, at D5 (quoting Commissioner Rehn).
92. Kirwin, supra note 70. Since that initial rescue effort, the Irish Government has
required Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide Building Society (INBS) to merge, and the
resulting entity will unwind over the next ten years. Joe Kirwin, EC Clears Plan to Wind
Down Two Irish Banks, Creating Banking Duopoly, BNA lNT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, July I,
2011, at D5. This leaves only the two largest Irish banks standing, Bank oflreland and Allied
Irish Bank, and they are each waiting approval of their own rescue plan. /d.
93. Kirwin, supra note 70.
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ing it to obtain a $113 billion bailout from the European Financial Stability
Facility (EFSF) and the International Monetary Fund, which was approved
in early December 2010. 94
In mid-May 2011, EU finance ministers formally agreed to a €78 billion ($111 billion) loan package for Portugal, requiring fiscal consolidation,
privatization conditions, and "re-pro filing" of private investors. 95 Sponsored
by the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission, and the
European Central Bank, the three-year austerity plan requires Portugal to
reduce its budget deficit to three percent of gross domestic product by
2013. 96 Within that time, Portugal is also required to open up more of its
economy to competition, to privatize public entities, and to freeze publicprivate infrastructure projects. 97 In the financial sector, banks would be required to reduce their debt levels and to increase capital levels, through capital injections from the state, with the core "tier-one" capital-assets ratio 98
required to increase to nine percent in 2011 and to ten percent in 2012. 99
At this juncture, however, Greece was clearly experiencing difficulty
in implementing the terms of its expanded €1 00 billion (approximately $150
billion) rescue package, and the EU was beginning to consider a re-profiling
of Greek sovereign debt, in exchange for, inter alia, a sweeping privatization of more than €45 billion ($70 billion) worth of government assets. 100 By
mid-June, Standard and Poor's had down-graded Greek debt to CCC, making Greek public debt the lowest-rated in the world. 101 Yet the leading Euro
Zone members continued to resist any suggestion that the debt might need
to be restructured to provide fiscal relief to Greece. 102 Until the Fall 2011,
EU leaders continued to apply pressure on Greek policy makers to accept a
new package of economic austerity measures, in order to prevent a sover94. Joe Kirwin, EU Agreement Reached to Recapitalize Irish Banks, Spell Out Aid
Conditions, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Dec. 8, 2010, at D6.
95. Ljung, supra note 70; Joe Kirwin, EU Considers 'Re-Profiling' Approach to
Resolve Continuing Greek Debt Crisis, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, May 18, 2011, at
DB. The term re-profiling, sometimes referred to as "rescheduling," involves the voluntary
rescheduling of repayment due dates on sovereign bonds, by way of contractual modification. Kirwin, EU Considers 'Re-Profiling' Approach to Resolve Continuing Greek Debt
Crisis, supra.
96. Ljung, supra note 70.
97. Id.
98. "Core" or "tier-one" capital consists of equity capital (fully paid ordinary common stock and non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock) and disclosed reserves of post-tax
earnings. See, e.g., International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Basle Capital Accord), 5 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 47-105, at 51,125 (Nov. 6,
1991) (defining "Tier 1 capital").
99. Ljung, supra note 70.
I 00. Kirwin, supra note 95.
I 01. Thomas & Hauser, supra note 70.
102. Bengt Ljung, Greece's Creditworthiness Receives Downgrade as EU Discusses
Options, BNAINT'LBUS. &FIN. DAILY, May 10,2011, at D5.
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eign debt default. The arrangement was expected to involve a "Brady bond"
type of arrangement, 103 under which European banks with the largest exposures in Greek sovereign debt would agree to a write-down of as much as
fifty to sixty percent of the bonds they hold as they were rolled over into
new thirty-year bonds. 104
A key change in the atmospherics of the negotiations among· Euro
Zone finance ministers came on June 17, 2011, when the German Chancellor dropped demands for a "quantifiable and creditable" loan concession on
the part of private creditors as a condition of approval of any new bailout
plan for Greece. 105 Instead, Chancellor Merkel expressed willingness to accept an approach under which private creditors would be required to agree
to rollover bonds as they mature into new bonds at more concessionary
rates. 106 Furthermore, on June 20, 2011, the Euro Zone finance ministers
agreed that the new European Stability Mechanism (ESM), set to begin in
2013, 107 would not accord preferred creditor status on bailout funds relating
to Greece, Ireland, or Portugal. 108 If this consensus holds, it would increase
the likelihood that these countries would in the future be able to attract private investors if and when they returned to the bond markets. 109 At the same
time, instead of releasing some $16 billion in bailout funding due in July in
order to keep the Greek Government solvent, the Euro Zone finance ministers delivered an ultimatum that required approval of a new package of job
and pay cuts before the funding would be made available. 110
Greece yielded on June 30, 2011, to EU demands that it approve drastic new fiscal austerity measures, and German banks indicated that they

103. So-called "Brady bonds" are an artifact of the 1980s sovereign debt crisis in
Latin America, in which U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicolas Brady negotiated the roll-over of
Latin American government bonds by institutional investors, into newly issued bonds with
financing support and guarantees from public international financial institutions. For discussion of the elements of the Brady plan, see MICHAEL P. MALLOY, INTERNATIONAL BANKING:
CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 263 (2d ed. 2005).
104. Bengt Ljung, EU Chiefs Settle Bank Recap Issue, Pursue Greek Debt Fix, Boost
for EU Bailout Fund, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Oct. 27, 2011, available at
http://www.bna.com.
105. Joe Kirwin, Euro Zone Spies Daylight on Greek Deadlock As Germans Soften
Private Creditor Demands, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, June 20, 2011, at D7.
106. !d.
107. See Joe Kirwin, EU Leaders Resolve Euro Zone Doubts with New Pact, Including Bailout Mechanism, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Mar. 28, 2011, at 04 (discussing
ESM).
108. Joe Kirwin, Euro Zone Makes Exception for Private Debt in $1 Trillion Bailout
Facility to Begin 2013, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, June 21,2011, at D6.
109. !d.
II 0. Joe Kirwin, Euro Zone Gambles on Greek Government Backing Austerity Package of Pay, Job Cuts, BNA lNT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, June 21,2011, at 07.
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were ready to back a Greek debt rollover plan. 111 Euro Zone finance ministers are now expected to approve the next installment of rescue lending of
approximately $16 billion to maintain Greek solvency for the next few
months. 112
The current crisis highlighted the limits and shortcomings of the supervisory structure of the EU. 113 The risk concentrations were not detected.
Surveillance and supervision were not effective or timely. 114 Much of this
was due to the difficulty of coordinating between national financial supervisors within the EU member states. 115 Coordination was especially difficult at
the height of the crisis in fall 2008, as large transborder banks confronted
challenges. 116
Clearly, there is a need for effective supervisory authority at the EU
level. Member states bailed out banks over the past two years in a wide variety of approaches, with little or no guidance or involvement at the EU
level. In April 2010, Internal Markets Commissioner Michel Barnier called
for the establishment of a "'coordinated resolution framework"' that would
give the EU authorities a "tool box" of supervisory powers to prevent or
intervene in bank crises in the future. 117 The tool box is expected to include
more harmonized, preventive powers with respect to corporate governance
standards, risk management requirements, and early intervention powers
that would allow authorities to prohibit unsafe activities or to limit dividends.118
As of January 1, 2011, however, the European Systemic Risk Board
(ESRB)-a macro-supervisor for the financial industry-and three sectoral
supervisory authorities assumed responsibility for EU-wide supervision of
the stability of the financial system as a whole, not individual banks and
other financial firms. 119 The ESRB, headquartered in the European Central
Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt, will be responsible for "early warnings when systemic risks are building up." 120 It is chaired by the ECB president and includes the "heads of EU central banks [as well as] national and European

Ill. Joe Kirwin, Euro Zone Ministers Expected to Back Greek Aid, Consider New
Bank Rollover Plan, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, July I, 2011, at D4.
112. !d.
113. Bengt Ljung, Barnier Hails New EU Authorities to Supervise Banks, Markets,
Pensions, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Jan. 4, 2011, available at http://www.bna.com
(discussing supervisory conditions during crisis).
114. !d.
115. !d.
116. !d.
117. Joe Kirwin, EC Outlines 'Tool Box' Plans for Crisis Prevention, Management,
BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, April20, 2010, available at http://www.bna.com.
118. !d.
119. Ljung, supra note 113.
120. !d.
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financial supervisors." 121 The three sectoral supervisors are the European
Banking Authority (EBA) based in London, the European Securities and
Markets Authority (ESMA) based in Paris, and the European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOP A) based in Frankfurt. 122 While
these new regulatory entities are intended to have broad supervisory authority, the ongoing financial crisis and its ad hoc treatment by EU and international institutions has distracted attention from these new structures. It
remains to be seen whether they will in fact be able to provide efficiently
and effectively the kind of early-warning, swift-response approach to systemic financial crisis that was so lacking in the current crisis.
Something more was required at the micro-level, however. In June
2010, the European Commission suggested in a green paper that stricter
corporate governance and enhanced shareholder rights for financial service
companies would be required to support the effectiveness of any new regulations that the EU might adopt to prevent future fmancial crises. 123 A year
later, we are still searching for such rules.
A European meltdown was only averted in 2010 by establishing an
emergency $1 trillion joint bailout fund together with the International
Monetary Fund. 124 At this stage, the current debate needs to shift its focus
from the public solvency issues that have dominated public attention so far,
and concentrate on improving safety and soundness supervision throughout
the EU. One element of this new approach would be to establish a permanent emergency contingency fund, like the U.S. Treasury's Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF), 125 designed to act as a fall-back in the face of any future Euro Zone country sovereign debt problems. The European Financial
Stabilization Mechanism (EFSF), initiated in May 2010 in response to the
risk of a Euro'meltdown, will expire-in 2013. 126 The ESM, set to begin in
2013 with funding planned to be in excess of €675 billion (neatly $1 tril-

121. !d.
122. !d.
123. Commission Green Paper on Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions
and Remuneration Policies, COM(2010) 284 final (June 2, 2010), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/com20 I 0_ 284_en.pdf.
124. Joe Kirwin, Andrea Schuessler & Diana I. Gregg, EU Ministers, ECB, IMF
Marshal Forces To Stabilize Euro With Trillion Dollar Plan, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY,
May 11, 2010, available at http://www.bna.com (discussing 2010 bailout measures).
125. 31 U.S.C. § 5302 (2006) (authorizing use ofESF for exchange transactions and
other investment activities); see also 22 U.S.C. § 262r-3 (2006) (providing for reports on use
of ESF in IMF stabilization programs); see generally id. §§ 286e-3, 286o-286p (2006) (authorizing use ofESF in connection with IMF transactions).
126. Joe Kirwin, European Commission Proposes Bank Tax as Way to Finance Euro
Zone Bailout Fund, BNA lNT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Jan 18, 2011, available at
http://www.bna.com.
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lion), 127 would have the authority to buy primary market bonds of a Euro
Zone country requiring its assistance, so long as the country commits to an
austerity budget package.
However, funding the ESM may be problematic. In January 2011, the
European Commission suggested that Euro Zone members impose a onetime 0.2 percent tax on Euro Zone bank assets, which should yield revenues
of €45 billion (approximately $66 billion) to help finance the ESM. 128 This
provoked intense criticism from European banking interests, and resistance
from member states participating in negotiations to create the ESM. 129 As a
result, final approval of the overall design of the ESM was not achieved
until March 2011. 130
This reluctance may suggest that, outside of traditional EU concerns
and authority, EU policymakers still confront to some extent a system that
thinks in national perspectives with only ad hoc consideration of regional
supervisory concerns. As a result, a major crisis in the financial services
market is almost inevitably viewed at first as an individual member state
concern, with the attention of EU official typically limited to the effects of
the rescue on European competition and subsidy policy. 131 With the capital
markets still very much in play, this policy horizon must widen or the benefits of European single market policy may contract.
II. U.S. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS

A. Dodd-Frank and the Crisis
While early attempts by the U.S. Government to respond to the crisis
may have seemed half-hearted, the deepening crisis demanded action, and
eventually the demand led to the enactment on July 21, 2010, of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA), 132 the most
significant structural response so far to the ongoing financial crisis precipitated by the failure of the subprime mortgage market. In many respects the
127. Joe Kirwin, EU Leaders Resolve Euro Zone Doubts with New Pact, Including
Bailout Mechanism, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Mar. 28, 2011, available at
http://www.bna.com.
128. Kirwin, supra note 126.
129. Joe Kirwin, Finance Ministers Make Little Progress Toward Revising Euro
Zone Bailout Fund, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Jan. 19, 2011, available at
http://www.bna.com.
130. Kirwin, supra note 127.
131. See, e.g., EU Governments' Subsidies Nearly Triple in 2008 as Result of Economic Crisis, BNA INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY, Dec. 8, 2009, available at http://www.bna.com
(discussing EU policy interests in competition and subsidy effects).
132. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)(codified at scattered sections of2, 5, 7, II, 12, 15, 18, 20, 22, 26,
28, 31, 42,44 U.S.C.) [hereinafter DFA].
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new act, sprawling over hundreds of printed pages, is dense and imponderable, 133 but its basic theme is to mandate new supervision and controls over
large and "systemically significant" financial institutions on the one hand,
and to create genuine consumer protection mechanisms at the federal level
on the other hand. Since administrative implementation of the DF A will
likely stretch out over several years, it remains to be seen whether these two
basic but diametrical goals can be maintained in balance with each other,
and whether the Act is adequate to the task of effectively reforming the regulatory structure applicable to the financial services industry. The principal
features of the Act are described below.
First, in a dramatic development, the DF A transferred the functions
and responsibilities of the Office of Thrift Supervision to the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency and the FDIC, 134 except for authority over savings and loan holding companies and affiliate transactions, which was transferred to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board (Federal
Reserve ). 135 The transfer was effective July 21, 2011, 136 and the OTS and its
director were to be abolished ninety days after that effective date. 137
Second, the Act established a Financial Stability Oversight Council
(FSOC), a committee of financial services regulators. 138 The FSOC is intended "to identify systemic risks, to promote market discipline, and to respond to emerging threats to the U.S. financial system." 139 For those nonbank financial companies identified by the FSOC as systemically significant,140 the Act has expanded and enhanced the authority of the Federal Reserve to supervise nonbank financial companies. 141 This authority is in addition to its traditional authority over bank holding companies. 142 DF A also
created FDIC authority to supervise resolution of financial crises-or "or133. For tabular analysis of the DFA, see I MALLOY, supra note 2, figs. 1.37 & 1.38.
For tabular analysis of regulatory implementation of the DFA, see id. fig. 1.39.
134. See DFA §§ 312(b)(2)(B), 314 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1, 4a, 11,
5412(b)(2)(B)) (OCC authority). Residual authority over state savings associations was
transferred to the FDIC.Jd. § 312(b)(2)(C) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5412(b)(2)(C)).
135. !d.§ 312(b)(l), (b)(2)(A) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5412(b)(l), (2)(A)).
136. !d. § 311(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5411(a)). The effective date may be extended under certain specified circumstances. !d. § 311(b) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §5411(b)).
Technical details of the transfer are handled by DFA §§ 302, 312(a)-(b), 317, 319, 322-327.
137. !d.§ 313 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5413).
138. !d. § 111(a)-(h) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321(a)-(h)). For discussion of the
functions of the FSOC, see 1 MALLOY, supra note 2, § 1.03[H].
139. DFA § 112(a)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(l)).
140. !d. § 113 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3523).
141. !d.§§ 161-169 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5369); see also id. § 170 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5370) (providing for safe harbor exemptions for certain types or classes
of U.S. nonbank financial companies or foreign nonbank financial companies from supervision by Fed).
142. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1852 (2011) (authorizing regulatory role of Federal
Reserve over bank and financial holding companies).
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derly liquidation"-with respect to any systemically significant financial
company. 143 This is distinct from FDIC authority over insured depository
institutions. 144
Third, DF A established a Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection
within the Federal Reserve to create and enforce effective consumer protection principles with respect to financial services. 145 Title X of the DF A also
appears to repudiate the broad preemptive effect of Watters and its progeny.146 Nevertheless, despite-Title X, DFA does not represent a clean break
with past preemption practices of the OCC and the OTS. 147 In certain respects, it substantially preserves federal preemption of state regulation of
financial services, but with important exceptions in the consumer protection
area. 148
Fourth, DF A restricts, but does not eliminate, proprietary securities
trading by banks. 149 For these purposes, proprietary trqding is defined to
mean
engaging as a principal for the trading account of the banking entity or nonbank financial company supervised by the [Federal Reserve] in any transaction to purchase or sell, or otherwise acquire or dispose of, any security, any derivative, any
contract of sale of a commodity for future delivery, any option on any such security, derivative, or contract, or any other security or financial instrument that the appropriate Federal banking agencies, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission may, by rule as provided in [§
1851(b)(2)], determine. 150

143. DFA §§ 201-214 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 4403, 5381-5394; 18 U.S.C.
§ 1032(1)).
144. !d.§ 201(a)(8)(B) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5381(a)(8)(B)).
145. !d. §§ 1001-1067 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§25b, 1465, 5481, 5491-5497, 55115519, 5531-5536, 5551-5587; 20 U.S.C. §9702(c)(l), (d)). For an excellent survey of the
history and current state of consumer protection law and policy in the United States, see
Mark E. Budnitz, The Development of Consumer Protection Law, the Institutionalization of
Consumerism, and Future Prospects and Perils, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1147 (2010) (arguing
that consumer protection principles are embedded in U.S. law and policy, both in terms of
individual litigation and likely state and federal legislative policy).
146. See, e.g., DFA § 1044 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)) (establishing narrow
grounds for federal preemption of state consumer protection laws).
147. See I MALLOY, supra note 2, § 1.03[I][2] (discussing effect of federal preemption policy on state bank regulation).
148. See R. Christian Bruce, Dodd-Frank Act's Language on Preemption Forces
Some Quick Decisions, Lawyers Say, BNA BANKING DAILY, July 23, 2010, at D12 (discussing implications for preemption).
149. DFA § 619 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851).
150. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(4) (2011).
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In addition, DF A § 619 requires the FSOC to study and make recommenda-

tions on implementing this restriction on proprietary trading, known as the
"Volcker Rule." 151
Fifth, DF A imposes new mortgage lending standards. 152 These would
include rules implementing appraisal independence standards mandated by
DFA § 1472(a), which enacted the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) § 129E.
TILA § 129E establishes new requirements for appraisal independence in
consumer credit transactions secured by the consumer's principal dwelling.153 This would ensure that real estate appraisals used to support creditors' underwriting decisions are based on an appraiser's independent professional judgment, free of influence or pressure that might be exerted by parties with an interest in the transaction ..
Sixth, for all market participants, DF A imposes new standards with respect to securitization of pools of financial instruments. 154 Prior to the 2008
collapse of the mortgage market, securitization, the process in which interests in a pool of obligations or rights were marketed to investors as pro rata
securities, was one of the critical processes for moving mortgage obligations
into the capital markets as securities. This provision has the potential to
eliminate the danger of rampant securitization that was characteristic of the
subprime mortgage market at its height, but it remains to be seen whether it
will create a safer regulatory environment for the capital markets.

151. DFA § 619(b). The restriction is called the "Volcker Rule" for former Federal
Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, who first recommended the inclusion of a broader prohibition in the draft that eventually became the DFA. See Stephen Joyce, SEC Official: DoddFrank, Volcker Rule Protect Investors, Help Financial Markets, BNA BANKING DAILY, Mar.
9, 2011, at D20 (discussing Volcker Rule and current controversy concerning its regulatory
implementation).
152. DFA §§ 1401-1484 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701p-2, 1701x(a)(4),
(c)(5)(A)(ii)(III)-(V), (e), (g)-(i), 1701x-l, 2603(c), 2604(a)-(d), 2605(e)-(t), (g), (k)-(m),
3310, 3332(a)(1), (5)-(6), (b), 3335, 3338(a)-(b), 3339, 3341(b), 3342, 3345(c), (e), 3346,
3347(a), (b)(2), 3348(a)(2), 3350(6), (8), (11), 3351(a)(1), (b), (d), (g)-(i), 3353-3355, 5219a5219b, 5220b; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1604(h), 1607(a)(7), 1638(a)(16)-(19), (b)(4), (t), 1638a,
1639(e), (j)-(v), 1639a-1639h, 1640(a), (e), (k)-(1), 1691(e); 42 U.S.C. § 3533(g), 8108;
repealing 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c)(2)); see Truth in Lending, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,554 (Oct. 28, 2010)
(codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, Supp. I; removing 12 C.F.R. § 226.36(b)) (promulgating interim rule implementing DFA § 1472).
153. DFA § 1472 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639(e)).
154. /d.§§ 941-945 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(5), 77g(c)-(d), 78c(a)(4)(B)(vii)(l),
78c(a)(77), 78o(d), 78o-11); see also id. § 621(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2a) (concerning conflicts of interest with respect to securitizations); cf id. § 619(g)(2) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1851 (g)(2)) (protecting otherwise authorized sale or securitization of loans by banking entity or systemically significant nonbank financial company from prohibitions on proprietary trading).
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Seventh, DF A enhances the enforcement powers of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). 155 It also allows for the SEC to maintain an
additional $100 million of its revenues in a separate fund, which the SEC
could use as necessary, with a full accounting to Congress.' 56 Unfortunately,
implementation of these new powers has been stalled by skepticism on the
part of the new Congress.
Eighth, DF A requires hedge fund and private equity fund advisers to
register with the SEC and will subject them to SEC inspection and examination. 157A hedge fund can be defined as an investment fund open to a limited
number of investors and requiring a relatively large initial minimum investment, committed to the fund for a relatively long period of time. 158 Typically, its investment strategies are aggressive, with leveraged and derivative
trading intended "to increase the rate of return when the securities perform
well." 159 A private equity fund can be understood as an investment fund specializing in investments not quoted on a public exchange. 160 Typically, it
invests directly in existing private companies, or gains a controlling interest
in a public company and takes it private. Investors in these funds are usually
institutions or sophisticated, wealthy individuals who place relatively large
amounts with the fund for a relatively long period of time. 161

155. DFA §§ 912, 919, 921-929X (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§3101, 3114(a); 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77h-l(g), 77o, 77s(e), 77t(d)(3)(A), 77v(a), 78d-5, 78g(c)(I)(A), 78i(d)-(j), 78j(a)(I),
78m, 78m(t), 78o(b)(6)(A), (c)(l)(A), (e)-(j), (n)-(o), 78o-4(c)(4), (8), 78o-5(c), 78p(a),
78q(t)(l)-(2), 78q-l(c)(4)(C), (g), 78s(h)(4), 78t(a), (e), 78u(a)(l), (d)(3)(C)(i), 78u-l, 78u2(a), 78u-6, 78u-7, 78x, 78aa, 78cc(a), 78ddd(d)(l)(C), (h), 78eee(a)(3), 78fff-3(a)(l), (d)(e), 78jjj(c)-(d), 80a-9(d)(l), 80a-30, 80a-35(a), 80a-4l(e)(3)(A), 80a-43, 80a-48, 80b-3(t),
(i)(l), 80b-4, 80b-5(a), (f), 80b-9(e)(3)(A), (f), 80b-10(d), 80b-14, 7201(9), 7215(c)(6), 7216,
7217(d)(3), 7246(a)-(b); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1514A(a), (b)(2), (e)); DFA §§ 912, 919, 921-929X
(codified at scattered sections of5, 15, 18 U.S.C.).
156. !d. § 991 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f(b), 78d(i), 78m(e), 78n(g), 78ee(m),
78kk) (match funding).
157. !d.§§ 401-412,419 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-2(a)(I 1), (29)-(30), 80b-3(b),
(1)-(n), 80b-3a(a), 80b-4, 80b-IO(c), 80b-ll, 80b-18b). As a general rule, these registration
requirements are effective as of July 21, 2011, except that an investment adviser may, in its
discretion, register with the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 during this oneyear transition period, subject to rules to be promulgated by the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2
(2011).
158. MICHAEL P. MALLOY, PRINCIPLES OF BANK REGULATION 271 (3d ed. 2011).
159. !d. at 272.
160. !d.
161. The DFA treats these definitional issues less helpfully. See DFA § 619 (codified
at 12 U.S.C. § 1851), which defines both terms as follows:
The terms 'hedge fund' and 'private equity fund' mean an issuer that would be an
investment company, as defined in the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15
U.S.C. § 80a-l et seq.), but for [the Investment Company Act exemptive provisions in 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(l) or (c)(7)], or such similar funds as the appropriate
Federal banking agencies, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the
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Ninth, DF A provides for comprehensive regulation of swaps and security-based swaps by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
and the SEC 162 in consultation with the Federal Reserve. 163 The SEC and the
CFTC have joint responsibility for swap products, to be allocated between
the two agencies depending on whether the underlying product is a "security" or not. 164 Institutions deemed to be swap dealers-typically, large banks
that act as market makers in swaps by creating and selling them 165-as well

Commodity Futures Trading Commission may, by rule, as provided in subsection
(b )(2), determine.
The exempting provisions referred to in the quoted excerpt actually provide a more informative description of these types of funds as follows:
[N]one of the following persons is an investment company within the meaning of
[the Investment Company Act]:
(I) Any issuer whose outstanding securities (other than short-term paper) are beneficially owned by not more than one hundred persons and which is not making and
does not presently propose to make a public offering of its securities ....
(7)(A) Any issuer, the outstanding securities of which are owned exclusively by
persons who, at the time of acquisition of such securities, are qualified purchasers
[i.e., sophisticated investors], and which is not making and does not at that time
propose to make a public offering of such securities ....
(E) For purposes of determining compliance with this paragraph and paragraph (I),
an issuer that is otherwise excepted under this paragraph and an issuer that is otherwise excepted under paragraph (I) shall not be treated by the Commission as being a single issuer for purposes of determining whether the outstanding securities
of the issuer excepted under paragraph (I) are beneficially owned by not more than
I 00 persons or whether the outstanding securities of the issuer excepted under this
paragraph are owned by persons that are not qualified purchasers ....
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(l), (c)(7) (2011); see Clemente Global Growth Fund, Inc. v. Pickens,
705 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (interpreting§ 80a-3(c)(l)).
162. DFA §§ 711-716, 718 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 6d(h), 24(c); 15 U.S.C. §§
78o(c)(3)(C), 8301-8306).
163. /d. § 712(a)(8) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8302(a)(8)).
164. !d. § 717 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(l)(C), 7a-2(c)(l); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c-1,
78s(b)(10)); cf id. § 720 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8308) (memorandum of understanding to
be negotiated between CFTC and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission). The SEC and the
CFTC have already jointly issued proposed rules "further defining" key terms and regulating
"mixed swaps." Definitions Contained in Title VII of Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 51,429 (proposed Aug. 20, 20 10) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 1 (CFTC rules); pt. 240 (SEC rules)). Public comments were due September 20,
2010./d.
165. At the same time, a "de minimis" exception from designation as a swap dealer is
available to "an entity that engages in a de minimis quantity of swap dealing in connection
with transactions with or on behalf of its customers." DFA § 721(a)(49)(D) (codified at 7
U.S.C. § la(a)(49)(D)). This clause is important for regional banks and other smaller financial institutions such as savings associations and credit unions and will enable them to avoid
the regulatory burdens likely to be associated with being identified as a swap dealer.
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as "major swap participants" are required to register with either the SEC or
CFTC, depending on the nature of their products. 166
Despite the welcome imposition of disclosure requirements with respect to, and federal supervision over, derivatives and derivatives markets,
there are still no clearly established jurisdictional lines between the SEC and
the CFTC over derivatives. For example, the DFA provides that the SEC
and the CFTC, in consultation with the Federal Reserve, must jointly "further define" certain key terms (specifically, "swap," "security-based swap,"
"swap dealer," "security-based swap dealer," "major swap participant,"
"major security-based swap participant," "eligible contract participant," and
"security-based swap agreement"), and jointly prescribe regulations regarding "mixed swaps," as that term is used in DF A Title VII. 167 Hence, at the
statutory level there remains fundamental uncertainty about the scope of the
new derivatives approach.
Tenth, DF A imposes disclosure requirements on credit rating agencies, and requires their registration with and supervision by the SEC. 168 DF A
also expands the availability of private rights of action against credit rating
agencies. It eliminates an explicit exclusion of private rights of action arising out of 1934 Act, 169 requiring registration of nationally recognized statistical rating organizations. 170 It also includes credit rating agencies implicitly
among the "persons liable" under the 1933 Act for having prepared or certified part of a registration statement by eliminating an SEC rule 171 that
deemed credit ratings not to be a part of the registration statement "prepared
or certified" by a person within the meaning of the private right of action
under 1933 Act § 11. 172 Hence, credit ratings are now part of the "expertised" portions of a 1933 Act registration statement filed with the SEC, giving rise to an express private right of action against a credit rating agency
for materially false or misleading ratings prepared by it and contained in
such a statement. 173
166. !d.§§ 721-724 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ Ia, lb, 2(a)(l), (c)(2)(A), (i)-(j), 6(c)(l),
(6), 6d(t) 6m, 6q, 6s(l), 7-7a-l, 13-l(a), 16(h), 27; II U.S.C. § 761; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 83218322).
167. See id. §§ 711-716, 718 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 6d(h), 24(c); 15 U.S.C. §§
78o( c)(3)(C), 830 1-8306).
168. See id. §§ 931-9398, 939F (codified 12 U.S.C. §§ 24a, 1817(b)(l)(E)(i), 183le,
4519; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a(3)(a), 78c(a)(62), 78o-7(m), (u)-(v), 78o-8, 78u-4(b )(2), 80a6(a)(5)(A)(iv)(l); 22 U.S.C. § 286hh(a)(6)).
169. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(m)(2) (2006) (foreclosing implication of private right of
action resulting from registration of statistical rating agency).
170. DFA § 933(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(m)) (applying 1934 Act enforcement and penalty provisions to statements made by a credit rating agency).
171. 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g) (2009) (nullified by DFA § 9390).
172. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006).
173. Pre-Dodd-Frank litigation attempts to impose liability on credit rating agencies
that provided misleading favorable ratings for securitized subprime mortgage pools have
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Eleventh, DFA requires companies registered pursuant to 1934 Act§
12 174 to permit their shareholders to have a nonbinding vote, at least once
every three years, 175 on executive compensation. 176 DF A also requires disclosure by any person soliciting proxies in favor of a merger or other acquisition of any "golden parachute" compensation agreement or understanding
in favor of departing executives in connection with the mt;:rger or acquisition.177 These provisions of DF A do not appear to supersede substantive
guidance previously issued by the regulators. 178
B. The Crisis Continues for Small Business
Despite these and many other reform aspects of DF A, there are many
missing features and potential shortcomings in the government response to
the crisis. The absence of some of these features raises genuine concerns
about the adequacy and likely effectiveness of DF A. The fmal shape of the
Act reflects certain significant political compromises made by the Administration and/or the principal sponsors of the legislation, and it is not clear
that the political atmosphere will improve in the near term. For example, the
Act "does not address the operations of government-sponsored housing fi-

generally been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. Merrill Lynch &
Co., 714 F. Supp. 2d 475,481-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (dismissing 1933 Act§ II action against
credit rating agencies; holding agencies not "underwriters" for § II purposes); Teamsters
Allied Benefit Funds v. McGraw, 09 CIV.I40 (PGG), 2010 WL 882883, at *6-8 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. II, 20 I 0) (dismissing derivative suit by shareholders of parent company of credit rating
agency for failure to state adequate claim under 1934 Act § I O(b )).
174. 15 u.s.c. § 781.
175. The DFA allows for more frequent nonbinding votes, upon the approval of the
shareholders in that regard. See DFA § 951 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-l(a)(2)) (permitting,
at least once every six years, shareholder vote on frequency of compensation votes).
176. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-l(a)(l) (2011).
177. !d. § 78n-l(b)(l). For these purposes, the term "golden parachute" is characterized by the statute as
any type of compensation (whether present, deferred, or contingent) that is based
on or otherwise relates to the acquisition, merger, consolidation, sale, or other disposition of all or substantially all of the assets of the issuer and the aggregate total
of all such compensation that may (and the conditions upon which it may) be paid
or become payable to or on behalf of such executive officer.
!d.
178. For example, in late June 2010, the OCC, the Fed, the FDIC, and the OTS
adopted final guidance designed to ensure that "incentive compensation policies" at banking
organizations did not encourage imprudent risk-taking, and that they were consistent with
safety and soundness. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg.
36,395, 36,405-36,414 (June 25, 20 I 0). The guidance was effective June 25, 2010. 75 Fed.
Reg. at 36,396.
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nance enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac." 179 In some respects, the insolvency of these two enterprises and the subsequent government takeover of both in September 2008 are two of the strike points that
helped to unleash the meltdown of the capital markets. 180 It may reasonably
be argued that their long-term disposition should have been treated in the
regulatory reform legislation. 181 As it is, the two enterprises have already
"required about $150 billion in Treasury funds" to continue operation. 182
Even a cursory review of the principal features ofDFA reveals that, no matter how effective these provisions may be on their own terms, they are directed almost exclusively at macroeconomic, structural concerns, rather
than the microeconomic, interstitial issues that are likely to have the most
immediate impact on the small business sector. Many of the structural
changes may well result in a stronger, more stable system of capital access,
and this would eventually be of benefit to small business. However, the
extended deadlines for implementation of many of these measures-and the
growing political volatility surrounding financial services reform-make it
likely that the small business sector is unlikely to see improvement in its
economic conditions within a reasonable period of time.
Reform features that might offer indirect benefits to the small business
sector are mired in transitional mode. The mortgage market remains, three
years after the collapse of the subprimes, still largely under water, and the
concomitant retail activity that normally flourishes around a vibrant real
estate market is holding its breath. Prospective reforms in mortgage lending
standards, credit rating practices, and safety and soundness supervision are
still awaiting implementation.
DF A gave relatively little attention to direct efforts to improve conditions for the small business sector. There are nine DFA provisions that appear to consider explicitly the need for amelioration of the impact of reform
measures on the small business sector. None of these provisions is particularly proactive or of appreciably broad effect. The administrative procedure
for comment-gathering where a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities is expected has been amended. Prior to publication of an initial regulatory flexibility analysis that the CFPB, among other
"covered agencies," 183 is required to conduct, the Bureau must notify the
Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration and pro-

179. See, e.g., Mike Ferullo et al., Senate Sends Financial Regulatory Reform to
White House for President's Signature, BNA BANKING DAILY, July 16, 2010, at D12 (discussing situation of two enterprises).
180. ld.
181. Jd.
182. Jd.
183. On the meaning of the term "covered agency" for these purposes, see 5 U.S.C. §
609(d) (2011).
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vide "information on the potential impacts of the proposed rule on small
entities and the type of small entities that might be affected." 184 In the right
hands, this notification could lead to significant input in the rulemaking
deliberations of the CFPB, but it does not appreciably constrain the discretion of the agency to impose regulatory burdens on the small business sector.
By contrast, DF A does impose substantive limitations on the authority
of the CFPB with respect to merchants, retailers, and other sellers of nonfinancial goods or services that regularly extend credit subject to a finance
charge. 185 A seller is not subject to this authority if, pursuant to § 3 of the
Small Business Act/ 86 it "meets the relevant industry size threshold to be a
small business concem." 187 The breadth of this exception is narrowed by the
additional conditions that the seller must extend credit only for the sale of
nonfinancial goods or services, 188 and must retain the credit on its own accounts.189 As a result, this exception from the scope of CFPB authority is
unlikely to free up a small business determined to expand and diversify its
services.
Likewise, DF A provides an exemption from SEC registration for any
investment adviser that acts solely as the adviser to a small business investment company (SBIC), 190 or to companies in the process of qualifying as
SBICs. 191 Yet even here, the price of the exemption is an artificial limit to
growth and diversification.
The DF A offers no relief to small business owners under the new minimum standards for residential mortgage loans. To the contrary, the act emphasizes that, in considering a loan application a creditor is permitted to
take into account "the seasonality and irregularity" of any small business
income of the applicant "in the underwriting of and scheduling of payments
for such credit." 192
On the other hand, DF A does mandate the request for and collection
and reporting of loan application data with respect to the small business
status of applicants. 193 The purpose of this mandate is to facilitate enforcement of fair lending laws, and to "enable communities, governmental enti184. !d. §609(b)(I).
185. 12 U.S.C. § 5517(a)(2)(B)(iii) (201 0) (granting authority to CFPB).
186. 15 U.S.C. § 632.
187. 12 U.S.C. § 5517(a)(2)(D)(ii)(III).
188. /d. § 5517(a)(2)(D)(ii)(l). On the scope of the tenn credit for the sale of nonfinancial goods, see id. § 5517(a)(2)(A)(i).
189. !d. § 5517(a)(2)(D)(ii)(II). However, the credit may be sold or conveyed if the
debt "is delinquent or otherwise in default." !d.
190. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 661-689q.
191. !d. § 80b-3(b)(7).
192. !d.§ 1639c(a)(9).
193. !d.§ 169Ic-2(b).
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ties, and creditors to identify business and community development needs
and opportunities of ... small businesses," 194 among others. The data, analyzed and aggregated in accordance with the provision, 195 conceivably
would be a useful tool for identifying "redlining" of small business loan
applications by a financial institution. As a general rule, no loan underwriter, financial institution loan officer or employee, or affiliate is permitted
access to this data. 196 This seems somewhat impractical, especially since the
seasonality or irregularity of small business income can be considered by a
creditor in deciding on the terms of mortgage loans. 197 Indeed, this provision
itself recognizes that the financial institution might consider it important for
the underwriter or others to have access to the information in making a determination on the application. The institution may do so, provided that it
gives notice to the loan applicant, "along with notice that the financial institution may not discriminate on the basis of such information." 198 Obviously,
this last notice might be somewhat misleading, since DF A itself allows the
small business source of repayment income to be considered in determining
whether income is seasonable or irregular.
On the somewhat controversial issue of interchange debit transaction
fees, 199 DF A could actually give small businesses some relief, although it
remains doubtful whether it will. DF A expressly limits any interchange
transaction fee that any debit card issuer may receive or charge on an electronic debit transaction to what is "reasonable and proportional to the cost
incurred by the issuer with respect to the transaction,"200 and authorizes the
Federal Reserve to promulgate rules implementing the provision and preventing circumvention or evasion. However, in promulgating these rules,
the Federal Reserve was required to "consult, as appropriate, with ... the
Administrator of the Small Business Administration,"201 among others. The
provision gives no indication as to the parameters of this consultation, and
the provision's explicit understanding of what constitutes a "small issuer" of
debit cards-"any issuer that, together with its affiliates, has assets of less .
than $10,000,000,000mo2-raises a question as to the congressional motiva-

194. !d.§ 169lc-2(a).
195. See id. § 169lc-2(e)-(t) (concerning compilation and maintenance of data, submission to CFPB).
196. !d.§ 169lc-2(d)(1).
197. !d. § 1639c(a)(9); see supra text accompanying note 192.
198. !d. § 1691 c-2(d)(2).
199. See, e.g., TCF Nat'I Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d 1158, 1162 (8th Cir. 2011)
(denying preliminary injunction in case challenging constitutionality of interchange debit
transaction fee restrictions).
200. 15 U.S. C. § 1693o-2(a)(2) (2011 ).
201. !d. § 1693o-2(a)(4)(C).
202. !d. § 1693o-2(a)(6)(A).
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tion in exempting small issuers. Apparently, "small" was never a more relative concept than it is now.
Only in the area of community development policy do we get any
straightforward expression of the need for affirmative support of small
business growth and development, 203 and then only as an annotation to a
codified section of the Housing and Community Development Act. 204 We
are told that out of fresh funds allocated for community development, the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development should be guided by, among
others, the principle that "[a]n eligible entity receiving a grant ... shall, to
the maximum extent feasible, provide for the hiring of employees who reside in the vicinity ... of projects funded under this section or contract with
small businesses that are owned and operated by persons residing in the
vicinity of such projects."205 That lawyerly phrase "to the maximum extent
feasible" 206 speaks volumes about the limits ofDFA's concern with the viability of small businesses in the midst of the Great Recession. 207
Small business lending by credit card banks is supposed to be encouraged by amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act, 208 but at most this
may free up lending by credit card banks to small businesses from the as yet
unquantified regulatory costs of BHCA regulation. One might question
whether these assumed cost savings would adequately incentivize small
business lending-assuming that it is actually a realistic incentive in light of
the other restrictions on the exemption. 209
203.

See DFA, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1497, 124 Stat. 1376, 2209 (codified at 42

u.s.c. § 5301).

204. /d.
205. /d. § 1497(a)(8) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5301) (emphasis added).
206. /d.
207. Thus, according to Webster's New World College Dictionary 519 (4th ed. 2000),
"feasible" can be defined as "capable of being done or carried out; practicable; possible," but
it carries a secondary-and more nuanced-meaning of"within reason; likely or probable."
208. See DFA § 628 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(F)(v)) (exempting from
definition of bank, for purposes of BHCA, any institution making commercial loans only in
the form of credit card loans "made to businesses that meet the criteria for a small business
concern to be eligible for business loans under regulations established by the Small Business
Administration under" 13 C.F.R. pt. 121, subject to other additional conditions).
209. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 184I(c)(2)(F)(i)-(iv) (2006), limiting availability of the
credit card small business lending exemption to
[a]n institution, including an institution that accepts collateral for extensions of
credit by holding deposits under $100,000, and by other means which(i) engages only in credit card operations;
(ii) does not accept demand deposits or deposits that the depositor may withdraw
by check or similar means for payment to third parties or others;
(iii) does not accept any savings or time deposit of less than $100,000; [and]
(iv) maintains only one office that accepts deposits ....
These conditions are cumulative, and therefore limit the applicability of the credit card bank
exception in§ 1841 (c)(2)(F)(v). See supra note 208 (describing exception).
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Finally, DFA § 1421 mandated a GAO study and report to determine
the effects of the Act "on the availability and affordability of credit for
[among others] small businesses;mo a set of issues obviously not predetermined by the sponsors, and perhaps little more than a hope. In fact, given
the elongated implementation process in relation to many of the DoddFrank mandates, and the complexity of provisions, the GAO has expressed
considerable caution-if not outright pessimism-about the likelihood that
a definitive study could be completed at this relatively early stage in DF A
implementation. The GAO explained,
Because regulations governing implementation of these provisions are still being
developed, the criteria we assessed could change based on rulemakers' review of
comments from the pubhc on the proposed rules .... Partly for this reason, assessing the potential impact of the Dodd-Frank Act provisions is challenging at this
time. 211

III. ADDRESSING SMALL BUSINESS CONCERNS
The impact of the fmancial crisis and the ambivalent effects of the
government response have created serious and continuing risks for the small
business sector. This is a critical issue. As the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York stated in October 2010,
Small businesses are vital to supporting the economic recovery. Small firms employ nearly half of all Americans, account for about 60 percent of gross job creation, and historically have created more jobs than larger firms at the start of economic recoveries. Yet recent contractions in business borrowing may be limiting
the capacity of small businesses to play this critical role. As policymakers and
stakeholders pursue measures to support sustainable lending to creditworthy firms,
questions arise about how much of the credit decline may be attributed to weaker
demand for loans; how much reflects weakened applicant quality; and how much is
due to restricted credit availability .212

Neglected in favor of "too big to fail" financial services institutions
during the early improvised stages of the government response, the sector
often seems lost in the details of the programmatic initiatives of DF A. Indeed, a July 2011 study by Celent, a financial institutions research and advisory firm, predicts an accelerating concentration of U.S. deposits among the
largest banks and a corresponding rapid decline in community banks. 213 Yet
a pervasive recovery from the crisis must include the revitalization of the

210. DFA § 1421(a).
211. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 68, at 4.
212. Access to Credit: Poll Evidence from Small Businesses, FACTS & TRENDS, Oct.
2010, at I (footnote omitted), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/regionaV
2010_Facts_Trends_Vol_3_2.pdf.
213. BART NARTER, CELENT, IT TAKES MORE THAN A VILLAGE REDUX (2011), available at http://image.exct.net/lib/ffil21672706400/d/ I /morethanavillageredux.pdf.
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small business sector if the recovery hopes to be deep-rooted. There are
avenues available to reach this desired result, and many of them would involve existing supervisory and regulatory authority.
By way of conclusion and as an invitation to further reflection, I
would suggest the following measures as promising the needed revitalization of the sector. First, the federal depository institutions regulators need to
resolve to invoke the Community Reinvestment Act (CRAY' 4 aggressively
to encourage depository institutions to give greater focus to the credit needs
of small businesses in the communities that they serve.
Second, the regulators have broad statutory enforcement and compliance powers/' 5 virtually untouched by DFA, 216 to take enforcement action
against unsafe and unsound banking practices and violations of laws, rules,
and regulations. These powers, firmly committed to the broad discretion of
the regulators in their application, 217 could be activated to address a wide
range of questionable practices by depository institutions that impact small
business customers.
Third, the regulators should give high priority to the timely and effective implementation of Dodd-Frank mandates such as those identified in the
previous subsection of this Article. 218 In March 2011, Federal Reserve
Chairman Ben S. Bemanke assured the national convention of the Independent Community Bankers of America (ICBA) that the needs of commu214. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (2011). For analysis of the CRA, see I MALLOY, supra
note 2, § 2.05; see also David Evan Cohen, Comment, The Community Reinvestment ActAsset or Liability?, 75 MARQ. L. REv. 599 (1992); Michael E. Schrader, Competition and
Convenience: The Emerging Role of Community Reinvestment, 67 IND. L.J. 331 (1992).
215. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 1786, 1818 (formal enforcement powers of National
Credit Union Administration and banking regulators). For analysis of these powers, see
Michael P. Malloy, Nothing to Fear but FIRREA Itself.· Revising and Reshaping the Enforcement Process of Federal Bank Regulation, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1117 (1989) (discussing the
formal enforcement powers of the federal depository institutions regulators); Stephen K.
Huber, Enforcement Powers of the Federal Banking Agencies, 7 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 123
( 1988) (exhaustive discussion of range of state and federal criminal and formal and informal
civil enforcement authorities).
216. Cf DFA, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 172(b), 362(3), 363(3), 367(7), 1090(1), 124
Stat. 1376, 1439, 1549-52, 1557, 2093-94 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1786(g)(7), 1818,
1818(t)).
217. See, e.g., Groos Nat' I Bank v. Comptroller of the Currency, 573 F.2d 889, 89697 (5th Cir. 1978) (extensions of credit by bank in violation of written agreement with OCC
constituted unsafe and unsound practices); Wachtel v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 982 F.2d
581 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (order for restitution of failed bank's asset deficit requires showing of
recklessness or unjust enrichment under§ 1818(b)(6)(a)); Spiegel v. Ryan, 946 F.2d 1435
(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 970 (1992) (discussing§ 1818(c)(l)); Greenberg v.
Comptroller of the Currency, 938 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1991) (OCC suit against director after
separation from service). But see Gulf Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n. v. Fed. Home Loan Bank
Bd., 651 F.2d 259, 264 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982) (limiting
discretion).
218. See supra Section II.B.
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nity banks would be factored into the Federal Reserve's DFA rulemaking
and into new capital rules under the Basel III framework. 219 Yet little tangible progress has materialized since then. While the regulatory responsibilities imposed by DFA are certainly weighty, a proper sense of what mandates are critical, as well as feasible, should lead the regulators to take steps
to ensure that the operations of depository institutions support a recovery of
the small business sector, and with it a sustainable recovery for the general
economy.

219. Stephen Siciliano, Bernanke Assures Community Bankers on Dodd-Frank Act
Rulemaking, Basel Ill, BNA BANKING DAILY, Mar. 24, 2011, at D9 (reporting on Bemanke
speech).

